Erdoğan, engaging in a quarrel with retirees at the worst possible time, suddenly transformed into a communication wreckage, casting him to the fringes of the popular political scene. The circulation of warnings in AKP propaganda groups that "Let's not talk too much about our President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. Especially retirees are expressing discontent," is not without reason. If the "People's Alliance" loses the metropolitan cities for the second time on March 31, Erdoğan's treatment of a crowd of 15 million people, all of whom are voters, will play a part in it.
However, retirees are just one element in the range of the dictatorship's "psychological operation" targets. The range is wide: followers of religious orders and communities, ultra-nationalists, the urban poor, anti-immigration groups, migrants, “people from the Black Sea region,” Kurds...
In August 2023, after the general elections, I wrote in this column, "Given Erdoğan and Fidan's 'unity of internal and foreign policy doctrine' centered on Kurds, amidst the significant political mobility Kurds have gained within Turkey's internal politics through HDP, it is doubtful that in the period before the 2024 local elections - that is, for the next six to seven months - the struggle for Kurdish freedom will not become a target of the dictatorship's psychological warfare."
This observation would not count as a prophecy, but it wasn't unfounded either. The lines below were the result of the need to make sense of Hakan Fidan's shuttle diplomacy between Iraqi and Kurdistan Region leaders throughout August, following his appointment as the Minister of Foreign Affairs in the new Erdoğan cabinet.
"Considering Fidan's initiatives and efforts in Iraq, and his attempts, along with his ministry, to bring Erdoğan and Assad to the table in Syria, it is possible to determine the strategic objective of the regime: Ankara is preoccupied with getting rid of the resistance rising from Northern Kurdistan, isolating the pioneering force in the North, and proposing a renewed anti-Kurdish pact balanced with economic and political benefits to the states of Iraq and Syria, in order to prevent the national capabilities and potentials of Kurds in Western and Southern Kurdistan from turning towards the North."
I also summarized the inward reflections of this foreign policy:
"Every step of the international strategy pursued by Fidan will inevitably aim to disrupt the political march of the Kurdish people, which brings them together with the democratic and liberating dynamics of other peoples, and to isolate and alienate the democratic liberation option represented by HDP.
"The short-term regional projection of the regime's 'Century of Turkey' vision regarding Kurds is limited to this."
Throughout the year, the regime systematically followed the political, diplomatic, and military logic of its sovereignty strategy and continued to strengthen its power. It minimized conflict with the US and overcame the obstacles to procure fighter jets for the F-16 fleet. Contacts with Baghdad became daily occurrences and began to reflect developments on the ground.
In early February, Minister of National Defense Yaşar Güler followed in Hakan Fidan's footsteps and met with the President, Prime Minister, Minister of Foreign Affairs, and Minister of Defense in Baghdad and then with Masoud Barzani and Masrour Barzani in Erbil. The key words in the statements given after the meetings reflected going from the table to the details on the ground.
Iraqi Foreign Minister Fuad Hussein also said in an interview with Anadolu Agency at the "Antalya Diplomacy Forum" in early March, "a good meeting" on security was held in Ankara. He said, "The Iraqi side has already prepared documents regarding security, border security, and the security of relations between the two countries," and expressed hope for "a meeting in Baghdad next month to discuss these documents and develop a plan based on them."
And the inevitable outcome... Erdoğan announced the "good news" at the Cabinet Meeting: "We are on the verge of completing the circle that will secure our borders with Iraq. Hopefully, by this summer, we will have resolved the issue concerning our borders with Iraq permanently. Our intention to establish a security corridor 30-40 kilometers deep along our borders with Syria is still standing. We have preparations that will give new nightmares to those who think they can bring Turkey to its knees with a 'Terroristan' established along our southern borders."
It can be predicted what Erdoğan referred to as "the circle that will secure our borders with Iraq" is likely to practically involve the widespread and deepening presence of military units with close contact with each other and military combat capabilities on the territory of Southern Kurdistan. It is possible to foresee that the translation of this strategy into the social life of Kurdistan will result in an approximately 20-30 km deep - perhaps deeper on the Iraqi side - area becoming a de facto military exclusion zone on both sides of the Turkey-Iraq border, and Hakkari and Şırnak settling into the target of military and psychological operations due to the socio-political significance they have gained as power centers of Kurdish patriotism.
Taking into account the desire and insistence of the Iraqi and Syrian governments for the withdrawal of US military presence from their countries in the shortest possible time, and considering that the possibility of Donald Trump returning to the White House next year is as likely as Biden remaining in office, it can be seen that immediately after the local elections, the regime's military and administrative presence along the borders will significantly increase.
In this conjuncture, Ankara will not only have grounds beyond internal security reasons but also excuses, in the form of "force majeure," to revise its plans for the "security corridor" to encompass all of Rojava, considering its role as the sole guardian of NATO interests against the possible "resurrection" of ISIS in the region.
Military operation plans extending beyond the borders of Iraq and Syria will not only fuel the possibility of conflict between combatant forces and the Turkish Armed Forces (TSK) across the border. As we know from previous experiences, it will also bring up the possibility of a military maneuver that will encircle Northern Kurdistan, starting from the border towns, effectively turning Kurdistan into a war zone.
Erdoğan's exaggerated speeches should not deceive anyone: when he says, "We have preparations that will give new nightmares to those who think they can bring Turkey to its knees with a 'Terroristan' established along our southern borders," it is more realistic to think that what drives him is not an insatiable appetite for bluster but rather what he remembers from the summaries of files based on these possibilities that remain in his mind.
The local election campaign of the "People's Alliance" is clearly lackluster, weak, feeble, and unconvincing. However, despite all objective unfavorable political, social, and economic conditions, the Erdoğan regime has not deviated from its strategy of reclaiming İstanbul and other metropolitan areas as it heads into the long, hot summer that awaits Turkey and Kurdistan. Holding onto a "scarecrow" in İstanbul requires a considerable show of strength. It is a visible possibility that Erdoğan's candidate is on the verge of losing, but it is still a possibility - not yet a reality.
Erdoğan does not have the "power" he needs to overcome these objective conditions. He cannot transform something that does not exist. He cannot invent a new ally for himself. However, the opposition camp, with its lack of self-determination, stupidity, cowardice, arrogance in considering itself a bean-like blessing, its politics devoid of sharing resources, and similar lack of intellect and foresight, can serve as a reserve force running ahead of its own ranks. It can open the way for the "geniuses" who theorize that the likelihood of the dictator abandoning the institutionalization of fascism is higher than a tiger choosing vegetarianism...
All of this may be as disturbing as the flies swarming around the sweaty bodies of those struggling in the summer heat. But in order to endure the toils of the long, hot summer ahead, what the Kurdish people and the democratic and social opposition forces in Turkey need is not Erdoğan's favor but to continue walking the path shown by reason and morality, to gain and protect what is rightfully theirs! (HA/VK)
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