The Cold War's end has required the United States to evaluate the global environment, its strategic priorities and security frameworks. This has included assessment of the role of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and the future development of Europe. A recent RAND report operated from the premise that through enlargement of NATO and the European Union (EU), "East Central Europe will become increasingly stable and integrated into Euro-Atlantic political, economic, and security organisations, [thereby] decreasing the need for security in Eastern Europe."1
In the post Cold-War era the new security context created by globalisation obligates to develop a new paradigm to study the security issues. The old Cold War context was comparatively, simple, "organised" and well defined, but the new security context is very complex and multidimensional. The interconnected and interdependent society brought by globalisation, by technological advances and by the huge increase in the mobility of people, goods and knowledge, has dramatically changed the way the world operates. Therefore, formulating defence and security policies requires re-evaluating the old concepts of threat defined during the Cold War era. The traditional concept of defence is associated with a strong perception of military threats. This is sound since the early days of mankind and until a few decades ago, direct physical aggression represented the fears of any community regarding likely external threats. The developments in weapons technology brought changes in defence thought, nevertheless the basic nature of the doctrines remained conservatively focused on conventional physical aggression originated by an external power. Non-conventional weapons, such as nuclear ones, imposed major adjustments, but again within the same military framework of age-old defence concepts. It requires going beyond conventional methods of intelligence, such as electronic and military intelligence and obtain, human intelligence, meaning data and analysis for understanding the socio-psychological processes that feed conflict and hatred against certain targets and countries.
There will be non-military threats in the coming century when the shortage of food and water in some regions could pose a treat to Europe, and when anti-Western, particularly anti-American sentiments nourish hatred in the Middle East, Asia and even in some parts of the Balkans. There will small scale terrorist operations with dramatic effects on a particular country and with massive implications for the world security. Terrorism and extremism in any region would likely have consequences for the security of other regions since we live in an integrated and interdependent globe. Moreover, globalisation, which is not a mere process of interaction in the information and economic fields, involves huge demographic growth, the much higher mobility of people, and the spread of new potentials and also new risks. Therefore, studies on soft security issues (including demographic developments, human mobility, access to and the use of technology, ethnic issue, the implications of globalisation on the disadvantaged people, etc.) are vital in understanding the new treats and formulating defence policies in the 21st century. This requires integrating sociology and anthropology in the security studies with an aim of developing a holistic and multi-disciplinary approach. Such an approach would enable to gather human intelligence.
In the paper, I will highlight the following developments that are need to be taken into consideration in re-formulating defence policies: demographic growth in the Middle East and scarcity of resources; terrorism and extremism; drug trade; rogue states; emergence of new regional powers; cyberwar; and the increased influence of Mafia in the post-Glasnost era and the organised crime.
Demographic Growth in the Middle East
The Middle East is one of the regions where inter-state wars, intra-state conflicts have cost large-scale human lives and material resources. In the Middle East demographic growth, shortage of water, and scarcity of resources are critical issues in analysing the security situation in the region and their implications for the international developments.
In the non-oil Arab countries, the 1970s and 1980s witnessed population increase and urbanisation without matching economic growth in real terms. Even regimes of the oil-rich Arab countries were running into trouble by the mid-1980s2. As radicalism has accompanied the demographic expansion, the implication of this process has become a concern for the students of Middle East politics. Alan Richards3 perceives the underemployed, semi-educated young men as a critical source of support for extremist Islamist groups throughout the region. Likewise, Charles Maynes4 focuses on the expanding size of the youth in the region and their vulnerability to political extremism. Maynes points that persons between 15 and 24 years of age constituted roughly 20 percent of the total population or more in Iran in the 1970s, Syria and Turkey in the 1980s, and Algeria, Indonesia, Iran, and Jordan in the 1990s. Some of the most politically violent societies in the last several years have been Algeria, Iran and Turkey. Maynes asks: is there any relationship between the larger size of the youth and political violence?
There is a growing literature that concentrates on the demographic growth, economic problems and political unrest in the Middle East where there has been a region of interstate wars and internal upheaval within the last half of the twentieth century. In the region the labour supply in most countries is growing well over 3 percent per year,5 because the population growth accelerated after the 1950s. There is a discrepancy between the demographic growth and economic development. "The economic growth of the region is even less impressive once population growth is considered. The population of the Middle East grew 2.33 percent between 1962-1975 and 3.08 in the 1975-1990 period. Thus, the rate of population growth for 1962-1990 stood at 2.61 percent, higher than the economic growth of 2.14 percent for the same time period".6 While the population grows, the rate of economic growth markedly decelerates during the 1990s, and in turn, creates unemployment problem and fall in real wages.7
The political implication of this discrepancy is a concern for many scholars. For example, Charles Maynes8 considers demographic growth and struggle over resources as critical factors that are more likely to affect political developments in the Middle East. Demographic growth changes the age structure of the population that has economic and political consequences. The larger proportion of the current population is composed of the young people who compete for scarce resources and job positions. In the near future the size of the youth will not shrink, but stay as the present size. According to Maynes, the following countries are expected to experience a new youth bulge in the first 20 years of the next century: Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Libya, Oman, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, the Sudan, Syria, and Yemen.9 Syria will become 50 million people by 2050 and Iran will swell to more than 160 million people10), and Egypt's population was 65 million in 1997 and according to the forecasts, it is going to be 93 million in 2020.11 This means that there is more likely to be unrest due to the struggle of the youth for limited resources in a region that has already had serious economic problems due to the lack of structural reform as well as effects in global economic developments. Despite the continued (thought reduced) influx of oil money, regional development remains surprisingly weak.12
Is demographic growth always associated with economic problems and political unrest? Demography exerts its influence through changing the age structure of the population and, in turn, results in political changes.13 When it happens, Tarek Yousef14 argues, there is a large growth in the labour supply and an associated higher accumulation of productive capital. However, capitalising on the demographic gift will require a flexible and dynamic work force and accumulation processes, such as financial and stock markets. Does the Middle East have such processes? Is the Middle East capable of absorbing the growing labour supply into labour market? The answer is not "yes" because according to Yousef's estimates, the number of people that Middle Eastern labour markets are expected to absorb in the next 20 years is enormous: about 160 million between the years 2000-2020; and 30 million in the next 5-6 years alone. Despite his optimism about the solution of the large labour supply problem, Yousef identifies a few problems that need to be taken into account to cope with the growing labour supply: large public sectors in the Middle East that would shrink in the near future and, consequently fail to absorb a large proportion of swelling labour supply;15 the educational systems that continue graduate students with skills that cater to the "civil service track", rather than to the private sector; and the legal regulations and constraints that inhibit fluid movement into and out of public and private enterprises. There are another problems that hinder absorbing the growing labour supply in MENA countries: the large and growing unskilled segments of the work force, with low levels of quality education. The second one is the problem of the lack of 'achievement motivation'. Decades of socialism, oil-based subsidisation, and protectionism, Sirageldin argues, have produced a 'culture of dependency' in the Arab world16. In addition to these problems, Ali R. Abootalebi mentions two other important shortcomings of the Middle Eastern countries: (i) the resistance of the political elite and entrenched interest against political reforms and economic adjustment policies since they see such reforms as threatening the status quo; (ii) high defence expenses and low investments in the economic and social developments (e.g., education and health).17
All these problems are more likely to be antecedents of a high rate of unemployment amongst the youth, which is already high (e.g., in Jordan, Morocco18, and Tunisia, roughly one five of urban young men were unemployed in 1993).19 This, in turn, would give rise to political tension and growing support for the radical ideologies with messianic messages. A crisis situation created by internal or external factors is also important for the frustrated youth to turn to a revolutionary movement. With regard to the role of the youth, Goldstone20 argues that a small change in the age distribution of a population could have a marked effect on popular mobilisation. Therefore, the growing size of the youth cohort and extended access to education are more likely to contribute to the mobilisation of the populace, which becomes critical at a time of crisis.
The demographic growth, expanding size of the youth and the migration from rural areas to urban centres played a role in the rise of the Islamist movements in the Middle East. With urbanisation, the Islamist movements, which were initially rural and provincial in nature, outgrown to become urban-centred national political factors. A large number of the newly urbanised young women and men, either university students, workers, civil sector employee, or unemployed, have joined the Islamist movements and become the major players. The initiatory players were composed of two main groups: (i) the former professional men of religion and tarikat shaykhs, whose political power was totally emasculated (as in the case of Turkey) or partially curtailed (e.g. Tunisia, Egypt, Algeria) as a result of the secularisation reforms executed by the secular nationalists who led the independence wars; and (ii) bazaaris21 (referring to those engaged in largely traditional, urban, small-scale production, banking, and trade and its artisans, merchants, and moneylenders). Religious figures and the shaykhs, who had mobilised people for the independence wars, were alienated from the formal political domain in the post-independence period. As a reaction, they withdrew themselves from formal politics and went underground to organise people for an Islamic cause (e.g., the case of Turkey, Egypt and Tunisia). It was not very difficult for them to motivate people for a religious cause because they did not loose their traditional influence on the masses that tended to seek the assistance and prayers of shaykh at a time of crisis. The major ally of the shaykhs promoting Islamist cause was the bazaari (esnaf in the Turkish case) who had been often threatened by economic dislocation as a result of foreign economic penetration or domination that always favoured big capital. Then in the 1970s and 1980s a new ally emerged: the youth whose size expanded dramatically in the Middle East. The urban youth, particularly those, who are the first or second generation in the city and those who often originated from the provincial lower-middle class, have joined the Islamist movements. Some of them are university graduates without essential market skills and qualities, and some of them are educationally disadvantaged young people, majority of whom are members of the expanding urban sub-proletarian. Their size dramatically expanded in the late 1970s and 1980s in the Middle East countries excluding the oil-rich states because of three major reasons. First, the population grew 3.08 per cent in the 1975-1990 period22in the region, and created a significant size of labour supply (as mentioned above). Secondly, the markets to absorb the labour supply have largely diminished. Neither the public sector nor the Western markets are more likely to provide the jobs demanded by the growing young population. Government payrolls cannot continue to expand; indeed, the imperatives of structural adjustments are already shrinking them.23 The Western European markets, which had absorbed the labour supply from Egypt, Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Jordan in past decades, ceased demanding labour in the 1980s. Nor can the Persian Gulf states generate employment opportunities to the Egyptians, Maghribis, Turks, and Yemenis as they did in past decades. Thirdly, the limited investment in education and failure to educate and equip the young population with essential skill and knowledge for the modern market create a huge size of semi-educated underemployed youth, who are vulnerable to extremist political currents.24
In the late 1990s, the population growth is still higher in many countries in the region.25 The competition in a region, where the youth are competing for scarce job positions, is an important challenge. This is one of the reasons explaining why the newly urbanised youth and the university students have become the major allies of the Islamist movements in the Middle East26 and Southeast Asia (e.g. Malaysia's ABIM movement in the 1970s and the Dakwah movement in the 1980s and 1990s).27
Scarcity of Water and Food
Security and political stability also depends on factors that influence not only the survival of a community, but also the possibility of maintaining its reasonable standards of living. The availability of food, water and energy establishes new limits between stability and conflict.
Transboundary management of natural resources, such as water, and environmental conversation28 are significant in maintaining stability and security. Over 800 million people are chronically under-nourished and in the Third World every years an additional 90 million citizens must be fed. In October 1999 the world population reached six billion, having doubled in the last four decades.
While it has become a scarce resource; the most critical factor in man's life, water is not equally distributed throughout the World. Today there are water rich countries, as well as water poor ones, or countries that are progressively becoming water poor. In order for a country to be considered to be water rich, the amount of annual per capita water must be over 10 thousand m3. For instance USA, Canada, Columbia, Brazil, New Zealand, are water rich countries. In some of them i.e. Canada and New Zealand, the amount of annual per capita is over 100 thousand m3.
The sharp growth in global population and development has badly depleted and polluted the world's water resources. This situation is keenly felt in India, China and Mexico; even in the US where there is a problem of deteriorating quality of water.29 The way of using water is cultural. For example, people who do not have a toilet and bathroom inside the house have a different concept of water and different manners of utilising it than that of those who have such facilities. Moreover, education is important in understanding the problem of the scarcity of water and using it in the most economic way.
One of the dilemmas, which complicates the water disputes, arises between using water for industry and agriculture and using it for domestic purposes. According to Nachmani, "forty thousand babies die every day world-wide, many from side effects that are directly related to extreme shortage of clean drinking water. For example, of the 5.5 billion people in the world in the late 1980s, 3.5 billion lived with less than 50 litres per person per day, one seventh the quality used by the average American. Agriculture uses 73 percent of the world's fresh water, and the world needs more agriculture because of increasing food need."30 In many poor countries, only taking grains and cereals from the global grain stocks prevents famine. Lately, however, these stocks have dropped sharply; in 1987 they were sufficient for 101 days, but as of 1989 for only 54.31
Water conflicts exist in many places: between India and Bangladesh (India diverts water from the Ganges which is vital to Bangladesh), Israel and its Arab neighbours due to disputes over water flow and diversion, Egypt and Ethiopia, Turkey Syria and Iraq because of the disputes over reduced water flow and siltation32; Slovakia and Hungary because they build up reciprocal tensions as a consequence of a dam on the Danube; Portugal and Spain have conflicting interest regarding their common river basins; US and Mexico have a dispute over salinisation, water flow and agrochemical.33 The problem of water shortage has already caused armed clashes34 and presents a danger of major military confrontations. The global ability to provide food and water to mankind will be a key factor in preserving peace.
Extremism and Terrorism
Ultra-nationalist35, far-left, radical Islamist groups , particularly those inspiried by Usama Bin Laden36 are gaining influence in many economically disadvantaged Muslim countries where the lack of access to resources and social services is a significant problem. The Islamist movements in the Middle East and Asia have taken two paths. The moderates have Islamists have turned away from militant politics and moved to the domain of institutionalized politics and civil society. Past experiences have taught many Islamists that violent struggle against regimes is futile and offers those regimes the opportunity to crush Islamist movements and activists. In responding to the new conditions, as Islamist groups have matured and developed infrastructure, roots, and sponsors, many of their members have moved away from confrontational and exclusionary tactics to espousing a politics of inclusion in the state. They formed political parties37 to contest for elections and compete for power through democratic and constitutional means. This has extended their appeal beyond the marginal elements in urban society to the educated middle class in the 1990s, and decreased the tension with the state. Despite the eased tension between the moderate Islamists and the governments in Turkey and Egypt, the degree of discontent was reflected in the failure of opposition leaders to distance themselves completely from extremist act and groups.38 While some radicals have joined this group, other radicals have taken a more militant approach, gone underground and strengthen their international solidarity with the transitional terrorist groups, like Usama Bin Laden's Al-Qa'ida).
Terrorism is a problem for the globe. Many states will have difficulties in coping with the militant groups and the separatists (e.g., the Tamils in Sri Lanka; Islamist guerrillas of Mindanao in the Philippines; growing Maoist guerrillas in Nepal).
The increasing number of murders in Algeria in the 1990s, the Taleban's oppression of the Afghans,39 several terrorist attacks against the tourists in Egypt (the recent incident took place in November 1997), World Trade Centre bombing in U.S. (1993) and lethal attacks against the U.S. embassies in east Africa in 1998 and many other incidents caused by the extremist groups in the Middle East (e.g., HAMAS, a militant Palestinian organisation operating in the West Bank and Gaza; the Hezbullah in Lebanon; the Islamic Group that attacks government officials and Coptic Christians in Egypt; and others40) are examples of the violent action taken by the militant Islamist groups). There are also terrorist attacks by non-Muslim religious fanatics. The terrorist attack in Tokyo underground with a chemical weapon is an example. They all continue to pose threat to internal and regional security.
The most worrying issue is the possibility of terrorist groups' access to nuclear weapons. The know-how to manufacture chemical, biological and nuclear weapons are available to many. It is difficult do fight this kind of treat militarily. It is feasible to strike a rogue country that is sponsoring such actions, but the proliferation of people and organisations involved will make the task of following and combating such developments an ever more complex issue. There is a possibility of nuclear terrorism by means of "man-made" accidents through the sabotage of commercial nuclear plants. However, if they do not have the nuclear weapons, they could still use other weapons to organise small-scale terrorist acts as long as they people who are determined to kill and to sacrifice their life
Another treat that comes from the developed western European countries is the rise of racism and neo-Nazi movements challenge the culture of peace and tolerance and create obstacles for the peaceful co-existence of various ethnic and religious groups. Migration from the Middle East, Africa and Asia to Europe and the likely increase of un-employment in the Western Europe would complicate the growing racism. This would lead to alienation of the "migrant" communities and their attraction to extremist religious and national ideologies.
Narcotrafficking
Terrorist groups often possess their own financial resources and means of raising funds, often through narcotrafficking, private business, independent wealth, and local financial support. Terrorist groups are financed by drug activities (e.g., the outlawed Kurdish separatist PKK, Taleban since from its infancy as a terrorist organisation) and they have the capability to develop the trafficking of nuclear missile materials and technologies in connecting with the organised crime such as the Russian Mafia. Thus narcotrafficking is a treat not only because drug poses danger to mankind, but it is also a source of funding for the terrorist groups. Preventing drug abuse is very important but a challenging problem given the fact that it has created its counter-culture and international network.
Rogue States
Rouge states are largely isolated from the world in terms of gaining access to universal information and international economic co-operation. This is the choice of the authoritarian dictators that rule them. The security policies of these regimes are often interpreted as irrational and aggressive. Iraq, North Korea until the end of 2000, to certain extent Syria and Iran are listed as "rogue" states. Based on a perception that they are aggressive and they have biological, chemical (e.g., Iraq) and nuclear weapons (e.g., North Korea and very likely Iran41), the superpower policy is to isolate and contain them. This, in turn, alienates them from the international system and norms. Alienation cause greater insecurity that could motivate aggressive policies towards "others". The crucial security-related question is how to reduce the treat posed by the rogue states? By improving the economic and political links between them and the outside world or by isolating them further?42
The shifts in the former alliances and dropping some allies in the post-Cold War era would likely encourage them act as rogue state and support global terrorist networks.
Cyberwar
Information technologies and telecommunications have contributed to the progress of mankind, but they also convey new vulnerabilities and risks. Technologically developed countries have seen that their infrastructure electronically integrated and accessible to those who have the know-how to penetrate the information networks, whatever their intentions. They also realised that a single individual in Africa, Asia or Latin America can, through the public communications network, scan computer systems with widely available tools, attack weak points in those systems, leave "sniffers" to get data and passwords and "root kills" to cover up their entrance, leaving viruses ready to be triggered later on, including mutating ones. Moreover, they can penetrate another country's intelligence, security and defence computer systems, get sensitive data and sabotage military capability to attack and to defend during a conflict. Cyberwar is being intensely developed by dubious international actors, which include organised crime (Mafia), terrorist movements, individuals and drug trafficking cartels.
Emergence of New Regional Powers
With the collapse of the socialist system in the post-Cold War era, the US emerged as the sole superpower. However, proliferation of international actors and regional powers need to be taken into consideration. In the meantime, China is turning itself into an economic superpower with a growing trade surplus, huge foreign reserves (around $ 150 billion), one fifth of mankind, an enormous internal market and a vast financing capability. It is also launching the foundations of a political superpower, as well as a military one.43 The People's Liberation Army is the biggest in the world, despite its present downsizing. China's newly acquired wealth allows the country to allocate resources for the modernisation of the army. Ethnic and religious diversity and tension would be sources of domestic stability and they would also bring about trouble for Asia, China's pragmatic policy would overcome those hurdles.
The Taiwan issue remains an open question. Sino-Japanese relations are not smooth. From the Senkaku Island to the very, very critical issues of the South China Sea and the Spratlys, China will be a key factor for peace or for war in Asia in the next decades.
Conclusion
Discussions on the European Union enlargement and the NATO enlargement process are the dominating themes in the studies on the security in the southeastern Europe. In discussing them, due attention must be given to the urgent need for security and defence concepts and responses that are radically new, which stretch beyond the conventional military strategic vision. The new security context is very complex and multidimensional. The major security problems in the troubled regions (including the Balkans, Caucasus, Middle East and Asia) have their roots in economic, social, cultural and political factors and that it makes more sense to conduct multi-disciplinary studies and focus on the soft security issues (such as demographic trends, anti-trends, the effect of globalisation on the psychology of disadvantaged groups across the world, the perception of the West and US in the Middle East and Asia) and socio-psychological processes that feed all types of conflict, etc).
Developing a new paradigm to study the security issues is essential to surmount new security threats. Secondly, it requires the integration of sociological, anthropological and socio-psychological studies in the study of terrorism, extremism and armed conflict. This means that studies on the concept of enemy in different societies are vital to understand the deep roots of conflict. It is also important to conduct demographic studies on the change of age structure in various societies and their political implications. Moreover, anthropological studies on the use of water and the way societies produce and consume energy are important in developing social strategies to share the limited resources.
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1 F. Stephen Larrabee, Jerrold Green, Ian O. Lesser, and Michele Zanin. NATO's Mediterranean Initiative: Policy Issues and Dilemmas, RAND Report MR-957-IMD, RAND: (Santa Monica: California, 1998), p. iii.
2 For the economic shortcomings in the region, see Ali R. Abootalebi, "Middle East Economies: A Survey of Current Problems and Issues" MERIA Journal 3/ 3 (1999), 5. Refer to www.biu.ac.il/SOSC/besa/meria.html.
3 Richards, "Economic Imperatives", 222. Also see Mark Tessler, "The Origins of Popular Support for Islamist Movements: A political Economy Analysis" (Paper presented at the Seminar on Political and Economic Islam, Washington D.C., May 19, 1992).
4 Charles William Maynes, "The Middle East in the Twenty-First Century", Middle East Journal 52/1 (1998): 9-16.
5 Richards, "Economic Imperatives", 221.
6 Abootalebi, "Middle East Economies", 5.
7 In Egypt, for example, unskilled real wages fallen by more than 40 percent after the mid-1980s. Richards, "Economic Imperatives", 222.
8 Maynes, "The Middle East".
9 Ibid., 11.
10 According to Maynes, Egypt is expected to climb from a population level of less than 70 million people today to nearly 120 million by the middle of the next century; Saudi Arabia is expected to nearly triple in size from 21 million to 61 million. Ibid., 10.
11 See http://www.infor.umd.edu/EdRes/Colleges/ResCtr..s-sb/sld029.htm.
12Abootalebi, "Middle East Economies".
13 Goldstone studied the revolutionary consequences of demographic growth in modern history. See Jack A. Goldstone, Revolution and Rebellion in the Early Modern World. (Berkley: University of California Press, 1991).
14 The views of Tarek Yousef expressed at a panel organised by the Middle East Institute: The title is "Population Challenges and Economic Growth", Panel I. Socio-Economic Implications of Rapid Population Growth". Refer to www.mideasti.org http://209.196.144.55/briefs/wbpanel.html.
15 Other scholars also mention the reduction in the size of the public sector in the Middle East as a result of the structural adjustment policies adopted in the late 1980s and the difficulties in absorbing the growing labour size. See Richards, "Economic Imperatives", 222.
16 See the panel organised by Middle East Institute: The title is "Population Challenges and Economic Growth", Panel I. Socio-Economic Implications of Rapid Population Growth". Refer to www.mideasti.org http://209.196.144.55/briefs/wbpanel.html.
17Abootalebi, "Middle East Economies".
18 In Morocco, in his letter to the King, the leader of the Islamists, Shaykh Yassine, presents the economic hardship in the country: He wrote: "Here is the result in figures of the brilliant method: United Nations statistics rank countries according to their rate of human development. Morocco is rated 125, far behind neighbouring countries such as Tunisia and Algeria. Good results! 12 million of Moroccans live below the poverty line i.e., with less than 10 dirhams ($ 1.00) per day. Almost three-quarters of Moroccans earn less than the guaranteed minimum wage i.e., 1,600 dirhams ($ 160) per month. Shantytowns are the usual settlement, and have become commonplace, for an increasing number of Moroccans. Salaries in Europe range between 1 and 10 or less. In Morocco they vary from 1 to 1000. 23% of Moroccans in the prime of life are unemployed. Let alone disguised unemployment, which would uncover a frightening figure. Young people take drugs to forget, or "burn" to flee the unbearable destitution. To "burn" in the Moroccan jargon means to stow away for a painfully hot or a deadly cold destiny. More than 100,000 holders of higher education diplomas (physicians, engineers, teachers, and quality technicians) brood over their helplessness and deception in the local café or demonstrate in the streets of the capital. 53% of Moroccans (official figure) are illiterate and fit to be taken for a ride by official propaganda or political party one-upmanship". www.yassine.net.
19 Richards, "Economic Imperatives", 222.
20 Goldstone, Revolution and Rebellion.
21 For the definition of bazaari, see Nikki Keddie, "Iranian Revolutions in Comparative Perspective," in Islam, Politics and Social Movements, eds. Edmund Burke and Ira M. Lapidus. (Berkley: University of California Press, 1988).
22 Abootalebi, "Middle East Economies". For the high population growth in the 1970s in the Middle East, see Michael C. Hudson, "Islam and Political Development" in Islam and Development, ed. John L. Esposito (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1980).
23 Richards, "Economic Imperatives", 222.
24 For the vulnerability of young urban sub-proletariat to political violence, see Saad Eddin. Ibrahim, "Crises, Elites, and Democratisation in the Arab World," Middle East Journal 47/2 (1993): 293-305.
25 The proportion of population in the age group of 0-14 years old ranges from 31 percent to 48 percent in the region. Refer to www. odci.gov/cia/publications/factbook.
26 For the support of the university students for the Islamist movement in Iran, see Eqbal Ahmat, "The Iranian Revolution: a Landmark for the Future," Race and Class XXI/ 1 (1979): 3-11; and Keddie, "Iranian Revolutions in Comparative". For their support in the Middle East, see Leonard Binder, Islamic Liberalism. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988).
27 For the role of the Malay university students in the Islamist movement, see Nilufer Narli, Unveiling the Fundamentalist Woman: A Casestudy of Malay Undergraduates. (Istanbul: ISIS Press, 1991).
28 Air and environmental pollution that can contaminate countries far away from the polluters; fishing grounds where depletion of pelagic fish imposes disruption of the natural life-cycle, affecting distant fish stocks, other countries' economies and vital protein availability.
29 Amikam Nachmani. "The Politics of Water in the Middle East: The Current Situation, Imaginary and Practical Solutions". Water as an Element of Co-operation and Development in the Middle East. (Ankara: Hacettepe University and Frederick Naumann Foundation in Turkey, 1994). SITA Publication. pp. 301-319.
30 Ibid. p. 302.
31 See Eugene Linden. "The Last Precious Drops" TIME, 5 November, 1990.
32 Ali Ihsan Bagıs. "Water in the Region: Potential and Prospects - An Overview." Water as an Element of Cooperation and Development in the Middle East. (Ankara: Hacettepe University and Frederick Naumann Foundation in Turkey, 1994). SITA Publication. pp. 15-26. p. 21.
33 For the water disputes in various parts of the world, see Michael Renner. National Security: The Economic and Environmental Dimensions, Worldwatch Paper 89. (Washington DC: Worldwatch Institute, 1989). p. 32.
34 For example, violent conflicts arose over water allocations in India, in early 1992, following a court decision to allocate the waters of the Cauvery River between the states of Karnaataka and Tamil Nadu. The Cauvery River originates in Karnataka, but the greatest use of the water is in Tamil Nadu, before it flows to the Bay of Bengal. Over fifty people were reported killed in riots in Karnataka following the allocation of additional water to Tamil Nadu.
35 The ultra-nationalist terrorist attack in the Armenian Parliament and killing of eight members of parliament and the Prime Minister on October 27, 1999 is an example of the alarming dimension of extremism.
36 Usama bin Laden and his al-Qa'ida organisation represent perhaps the most alarming trend in terrorism emanating from the Middle East. Bin Laden has created a truly transnational terrorist enterprise, drawing on recruits from areas across Asia, Africa, and Europe, as well as the Middle East. On October 12, 1999, Ambassador Michael Sheehan, co-ordinator for counter-terrorism at the U.S. Department of State, addressed The Washington Institute's Policy Forum. The above is a selection of excerpts from his prepared speech; the full text is available on the Washington Institute's website, www.washingtoninstitute.org. See the Special Policy Forum report was prepared by Rania Al-Shirawi. .Nina Bisgyer. [email protected].
37 Jordan and Lebanon are also examples of employing a politics of inclusion by the Islamists. They formed political parties to compete for power. The Islamic Action Party in Jordan has had representation in their respective parliaments. In Lebanon, the Islamists have been competing for seats in the parliament. In Lebanon the competition of the Shiah radicals for parliamentary seats is related to the dramatic transformation in the radical movements since the mid-1980s, when terrorism was their hallmark. See Judith S. Yaphe. "Islamic Radicalism" in Strategic Forum. National Defence University Institute for National Strategic Studies Publication. February (1997). No: 104).
38 For the examples of the moderate Islamist support for a violent act in Egypt, see John L. Esposito, The Islamic Threat, New York: Oxford University Press (1992), p. 98. For examples from Turkey, see Nilüfer Narli, "Moderate Against Radical Islamicism in Turkey," Zeitschrift Für Türkeistudien 1/96 (1996): 35-59.
39 In September 1994, the Taleban emerged in the south of Afghanistan and quickly gained the control of many regions. Taleban first conquered Kandabar and then swept north to capture Kabul on September 27, 1996. The Taleban, with a series of battlefield triumphs in northeast Afghanistan, is pushing to become the first force with full control of the war-ravaged country in more than 20 years. It was March 1997 and for two and a half years Kandahar had been the capital of the Taleban Islamic warriors, who had conquered two-thirds of Afghanistan. By the year 2000 they have been controlling almost 90 percent of the country and are now battling to conquer the rest of the country. In the meantime, in a growing number of foreign capitals, Taleban diplomats are waging their most concerted effort yet to end the international banishment of the puritanical Islamic militia. The Taleban is claiming the U.N. seat held by the ousted government of Burhanuddin Rabbani, the president overthrown in 1996 and now in exile in Tajikistan.
40 For selected militant/violent incidents by the Islamists in 1996, see U.S. State Department. Patterns of Global Terrorism 1996. (Washington DC: U.S. State Department, 1997).
41 According to Wihbey, Iran's possession of ballistic missiles with a nuclear programme is a concern for the US. See Paul Michael Wihbey. "The Southern Eurasian Great Game" Insight Turkey. 1/ 2 (1999): 47-70. During the 1970s and 1980s, the governments of Syria, Libya, and Iran played a prominent role in supporting and directing the activities
of Middle Eastern terrorist groups, as well as carrying out terrorist attacks themselves using state security or intelligence personnel. See the Special Policy Forum report was prepared by Rania Al-Shirawi. .Nina Bisgyer. [email protected].
42 For the debate on the US policies towards the rogue states see Fawaz Gerges. "Washington's Misguided Iran Policy" Survival. The IISS Quarterly. 38/ 4 (1996-7): 5-16. Also see Responses from Shahram Chubin and R. James Woolsey. Ibid. pp 16-22. For North Korea see Denny Roy. North Korea as an Alienated State" Survival. The IISS Quarterly. 38/ 4: (1996-7): 22-36. Also see Responses from Selig S. Harrison and Norman D. Levin. Ibid: 37-43.
43 From 1990-95 defence spending rose 23 percent in China. In August 1995 China made a nuclear-weapon test. See Yoichi Funabashi. "Bridging Asia's Economics-Security Gap" Survival. The IISS Quarterly. 38/4 (1996-7).:101-116. Also see Yoichi Funabshi, Michael Oksenberg and Heinrich Weiss. An Emerging China in a World of Interdependence. (New York: The Trilateral Commission, 1994).
